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Introduction
The rapid pace of technological development is a hallmark of this
century. The transition from the industrial age to the information age
has dramatically transformed society. High technology companies are
now a force in the economy.
The high technology industry is characterized by products
containing high information content, rapid innovation, vigorous
competition and network externalities, i.e., the high costs of having
non-compatible technology that cannot work with other developed
systems.1 These aspects of the industry have resulted in two
sometimes opposing trends. The first is the rush to secure proprietary
rights in the technology a company has developed.2 The rapid pace of
information acquisition and the relatively high cost of overhead to
develop the technology create the pressure to secure patents on
developed technology. The second trend is to create compatible
products, securing greater aggregate sales and increasing the useful
life of patents; a trend which drives corporations to develop non3
proprietary uniformity standards.
These two trends produce an inherent conflict between the desire
on one hand to develop open and communal uniformity standards for
an industry, and on the other hand to secure exclusive rights by
obtaining patents in developed technology. The tension between open
standards and exclusive proprietary technology has led to legal
conflict. This note addresses the problems that can result when patent
owners participate in the standard-setting process. It also discusses
how the courts have treated these problems. This note concludes with
proposals of procedures the courts could adopt to safeguard the
standard-setting process.
Uniformity standards are both increasingly common and valuable
in the development of high technology. Consumers and users of high
technology benefit from product uniformity which allows products to
be easily compared.4 In addition, new producers are allowed easier
1. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Standards, Antitrust, and Intellectual Property, 414
PLI/Pat 797, 799 (1995).

2. See James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Standard Setting Consortia, Antitrust &
High Technology Industries,64 ANTITRUST L.J. 247, 257 (1995).

3. Id. at 257. See also Nimmer, supra note 1, at 799-800.
4. Michael A. Epstein, Standards and Intellectual Property, 365 PLI/Pat 849, 850
(1993); Nimmer, supra note 1, at 800-803.
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entry into a market, which increases the number of suppliers.5 Finally,
uniformity encourages the development of compatible products,
6
allowing enhanced functional and economic value.
Producers of high technology also see the added value of
developing industry standards. Adopting standards extends the
marketable life of a conforming product, since compatible technology
will evolve around the standard once it becomes prevalent in a
market.7 Producers also have lower costs in developing new products
if they can rely on the base of standardized technology.8 Finally,
producers have lower marketing costs in bringing products to a
predefined market. 9
Developing industry standards for technology covered by
proprietary rights is not easy. Corporations participate in setting an
industry standard to lower costs and increase profits. The standard
should be freely accessible, so that a corporation can use it without
additional costs. A corporation with proprietary rights to technology,
however, will also benefit if their technology is adopted as an industry
standard. The standard-setting organization must encourage
participation in standard setting and open standards.
This note discusses various legal doctrines that can affect patent
holders that participate in the standard-setting process. This note also
analyzes infringement defenses against patent holders and antitrust
actions brought by the government. Finally, this note proposes that
the government, in bringing antitrust actions, should use the duty to
deal as a more efficacious remedy for unfair competition actions.
Corporations spend heavily to secure patents. The benefits
attained by securing a patent motivates further innovation. However,
corporate ownership of proprietary rights conflicts with the open
system of standards. Analysis of the implications for patent holders
who participate in the standard-setting process requires an
understanding of the law governing standard-setting bodies.

5. Id.
6.

Id.

7. Epstein, supra note 4.
8.
9.

Id.
Id.
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I
The Standard-Setting Process
Two distinctions need to be made about industry standards. The
first is between standards that develop naturally and standards that
are imposed by standard-setting organizations. A natural standard
evolves when a technology achieves sufficient market share to force
others to build compatible technology around this product. 10
Examples of such de facto standards include the DOS operating
system and the IBM computer system architecture.1 ' The market
12
creates the standard by product dominance.
In contrast to de facto standards, formal standards are adopted by
organizations sponsored by an industry. Formal standards create
uniform products in the market when producers voluntarily follow the
standards. The nature of this formal standard-setting presents a risk of
manipulation of the process for anti-competitive ends. De facto
standards do not involve this risk.
A second distinction exists between uniformity standards and
safety or quality standards. The uniformity standard increases
compatibility among technologies.' 3 In contrast, safety and quality
standards set the minimum requirements that products must achieve
before the product is allowed market entry. 4 Safety and quality
standards have a unique set of antitrust problems that this paper will
not address.' 5 Instead this paper will consider the development of
formal uniformity standards by private industry standardization
groups.
The effort to develop standards is coordinated by the
International Organization for Standardization (",ISO")16 and the
American National Standardization Institute ("ANSI"). 7 The ISO
publishes its standards. These standards can be voluntarily adopted by

10. Joseph Farrell, Standardization and Intellectual Property, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 35,
39 (1989).

11.

Epstein, supra note 4, at 852.

12.

Id.

13.

Anton & Yao, supra note 2, at 247.

14. Id. at 247-48.
15. Because the public interest is directly involved, the government may have more
involvement in these standards.
16. Epstein, supra note 4, at 852.
17. Id.
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high technology companies." Within the United States, ANSI
accredits standard-setting associations for various industries.1 9 These
associations are comprised of representatives from corporations
within an industry and develop standards for that industry.2 0 These
representatives must formulate procedures to address the problem of
patent rights as impediments to the development of open standards. In
order to understand the problems facing standard-setting
organizations in developing procedures to regulate patent holding
participants, the law governing patents must be examined.
II
The Patent Process
The patent system in this country has its roots in the constitution.
The United States Constitution states, "Congress shall have power....
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." 21 Congress acted on this grant
of power and enacted the first Patent Act in 1790.22 Congress modified
this Act several times, the most recent of which resulted in the present
Patent Act, enacted in 1952 and codified in Title 35 of the United
States Code.23
In its current form, the Act requires that an inventor seeking a
patent must prove that the inventor developed a novel, useful, and
nonobvious process or product.24 To determine if a claimed invention
is nonobvious, the statute requires that the invention not be obvious
to a person of ordinary skill in the art. These determinations are made
at the time of invention in light of the prior art.25 The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the United States Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO") recognizes that secondary, objective
factors, such as commercial success, filling a market need, and the

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id. at 852-53.
Id.
U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl.
8.
Patent Act of Apr. 10, 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. 88 1-376 (West Supp. 1996).
35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (1994).
35 U.S.C. § 103.
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inability of others to develop the needed technology, can also be used

26
to aid in finding nonobviousness and novelty.
In addition to requirements that the invention be novel and
nonobvious, the patent must fully disclose the invention and provide
enough information to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to
reproduce the invention. 27 The inventor of the technology must also
disclose the best contemplated mode of using the invention. 28 Once a
patent issues, the owner obtains the right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the claimed technology for a period of twenty
29
years from the application's filing date.
When an inventor applies for a patent, the PTO reviews the
application and decides whether or not to grant a patent.3 0 The PTO
may reject some or all of the initial claims, and the patent drafter then
31
amends the claims and distinguishes the invention from the prior art.
Once the patent issues, the PTO publishes an abstract of the patent
and adds the patent to the patent library. 32 The examination process
can take many years. 33 While the application is being reviewed, it is
34
inaccessible to the public.

III
The Perspective of Standard-Setting Bodies
The purpose of setting industry standards ig to develop an open
base of technology that serves the competitive ends of the member
companies. 35 Uniformity allows a broader market for a variety of
compatible goods. 36 Because patents grant exclusive rights, unlicensed
patented technology may be contrary to the uniformity standards

26. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
27. See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1996).
28.
29.
30.
31.

See id.
See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1996).
35 U.S.C. §§ 131-139 (1996).
3 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY,

VALIDITY, AND INFRINGEMENT § 11.03 [1][c] (1996).
32. Id. § 11.01.

33. Id.
34. Id. § 11.02 [4].

35. Nimmer, supranote 1, at 799.
36. E. Robert Yoches & Kenneth M. Frankel, Legal-Implications of Standards in the
Computer and Software Industries, 414 PLI/Pat 773, 775 (1995). See also Nimmer, supra

note 4, at 799.
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communal to an industry.37 Standard-setting groups know that their

members will participate only if the integrity of the standard-setting
process is secure, and the standards that are adopted will not end up
38
trapping production into their competitor's proprietary technology.
At the same time, individual corporate members seek to capitalize on
their own discoveries, and will not participate in the standard-setting
process if it appears to endanger the marketability of technology
39
contained in the member's patents.
One possible option for the standard-setting group would be to
exclude categorically all patented technology from any standards that
are adopted. However, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")
believes that the per se exclusion of technology solely because the
technology was patented and without any further evaluation
constitutes a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.4" An Ohio
standardization body, whose members consist of manufacturers of
plumbing products, agreed to an FTC consent order prohibiting the
per se exclusion of proprietary technology from inclusion into a
proposed standard as an unreasonable restraint of trade.4 ' The FTC
alleged that such a per se exclusion would result in the exclusion of
innovative products from market entry and mislead purchasers about
42
the nature of the product that was not included in a standard.
There are several pro-competitive reasons for allowing patented
technology to be adopted as the industry standard. Applications for
patents remain secret until the patent is granted. A per se rule against
the inclusion of patented technology would be impractical because
once these applications are granted, the standard would need to be
abandoned or revised if patented technology had been included. Many
patented devices claim cutting edge technology. Refusal to even
consider this technology would eliminate from inclusion into
standards technology that could prove beneficial to an industry. Even
if the technology requires licenses, members of an industry may be
willing to standardize using the more expensive but superior product.
Finally, the per se rule excluding patents could serve the
anticompetitive ends of barring innovators from the standard-setting
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Yoches & Frankel, supra note 36, at 776.
Id.
Epstein, supra note 4, at 853.
See In re American Soc'y of Sanitary Eng'g, 106 F.T.C. 324 (1995).
See id.
See id.
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process. The FTC consent order, by prohibiting the per se exclusion of
technology from inclusion in a standard, promotes competition.
Standard-setting groups must guard against standards that limit
competition. Courts have required that standards serve a legitimate
purpose and not be unnecessarily harmful to competition.4 3 The courts
guard against standards adopted to exclude competitors from market
entry or to narrow competition. A standard-setting body may not use
patents to erect a barrier to market entry. To be included in a
standard, a patent owner must make the patented product reasonably
available.
The organizations that accredit standard-setting bodies have
developed a set of policies to govern the groups. 44 The ANSI Patent
Policy states, "[tihere is no objection in principle to drafting a
proposed American National Standard in terms that include the use of
a patented item, if it is considered that technical reasons justify this
approach.''4 5 However, ANSI also adopted strict regulations
governing when a patent could be included.46 These regulations
require that the owner of proprietary technology that participates in
the standard setting process must: (1) disclose any proprietary
technology covered by the standard; and (2) agree to provide free
licenses to the technology to those who adopt the standard; or (3)
agree to license the technology at a reasonable rate and without
discrimination. 47 These guidelines have been widely adopted by
standardization organizations.
IV
Duty of Disclosure
A standardization body must not refuse requests for inclusion of
specific technology into an industry standard solely because that
technology is patented.48 But a patent owner must still surrender some
rights before proprietary technology will be included in an industry
standard. Standardization groups have policies requiring participants
43. See American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556
(1982); Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478 (1st Cir. 1988).
44. Yoches & Frankel, supra note 36, at 776; Epstein, supra note 4, at 862-66;
Nimmer, supra note 1, at 835-38.
45. ANSI's Procedures for Development and Coordination of American National
Standards [hereinafter ANSI Procedures], reprintedin Nimmer, supra note 1, at 851.
46.

Epstein, supra note 4, at 862.

47. ANSI Procedures, supra note 45, at 839.
48. American Society of SanitaryEng'g, 106 F.T.C. at 324.
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to disclose any patent rights held. 49 Failure to disclose a patent
covered by a standard may result in a ruling that the patent is not
enforceable under equitable and legal estoppel, the misuse doctrine,
or the doctrine of inequitable conduct before the PTO.
A. Equitable Estoppel
Although few cases to date have focused on the fate of retaining
patent rights during the standard-setting process, the cases that do
exist focus on the duty of the patent holder to disclose any patents that
would cover the standard or products made under the standard. The
doctrine of equitable estoppel may bar patent holders the ability to
enforce their patents if they participate in the standard-setting process
and fail to disclose their patent holdings.
The elements of equitable estoppel are: (1) statements or actions
that communicate information in a misleading manner; (2) reliance on
the communication; and (3) injustice resulting from the reliance.50 It is
critical to determine if the owner of the patent created the reasonable
belief that the patent would not be enforced. 51 Silence alone is not
enough to constitute a misleading action.5 2 But the further act of
promoting the standard while remaining silent about any patent rights
that may affect the standard has been found to be enough to trigger
the loss of the ability to enforce a patent.53
In an initial case where a court applied equitable estoppel, the
patent owner held a patent on a standardized magnetic tape recording
system.54 Potter, the patent owner, had licensed the patent to IBM,
and IBM proposed to a standard-setting organization that the patent
be adopted as the industry standard.5 5 Representatives of both Potter
and IBM attended the meeting where the proposed standard was
discussed and both remained silent about patented technology that
would be included as part of the standard.56 The court found:
49. ANSI Procedures, supra note 45, at 851.
50. See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1041 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
51. Id. at 1043.
52. Id at 1042; Hemstreet v. Computer Entry Sys. Corp., 972 F.2d 1290, 1295 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
53. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1042.
54. Potter Instrument Co. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 207 U.S.P.Q. 763, 765 (E.D. Va.
1980).
55. Id. at 766.
56. Id.
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Potter actively participated with the ANSI subcommittee in
developing.., the industry standard-it intentionally failed to bring
its ownership of the '685 patent to the committee's attention
notwithstanding the committee's policy to the contrary. By so doirig,
Potter has gained a monopoly on the GCR staxidard without any
obligation to make its use
57 available on reasonable terms to
competitors in the industry.
The standard-setting group used "a written policy, of which all
members were aware, stating that when any one or more patents are
to be included within a proposed industry standard, the owner of such
patent(s) must bring to the attention of the [standard setting body] the
existence of such patents."5 8 This was found to satisfy the initial
element of equitable estoppel.59 The court held that "[e]quity will
rarely, if ever, permit one to waive by acquiescence its alleged patent
rights, for a long period of time, and attempt to assert them after they
have been adopted as the industry standard., 60 The court found that
Potter had actively participated with the standardization group in
developing the tape technology as a standard. 61 Participation without
disclosure resulted in an estoppel that prevented the enforcement of
the patent.62
In another case enforcing this doctrine, the patent holder owned
rights to a device that verified the Personal Identification Numbers for
automatic teller machines. 63 The patent holder sat on a committee
that adopted his device as the industry standard and failed to notify
the committee that the proposed standard infringed his patent. 6' After
the use of the standard had become widespread, the patent holder
attempted to enforce the patent. 65 The district court, using the
equitable estoppel doctrine, refused to enforce the patent.66 The court
found that the owner of the patent had an affirmative duty to disclose
the patent rights and that the failure to disclose was affirmatively

57. Id. at 769.
58. Id. at 766.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 769.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Stambler v. Diebold Inc., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1709 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), affd, 878 F.2d
1445 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
64. Id. at 1714-15.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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misleading.67 The court reasoned that, "[the patent holder] could not
remain silent while an entire industry implemented the proposed
standard and then when the standards were adopted assert that his
patent covered what manufacturers believed to be an open and
68
available standard.,
These cases establish a duty to disclose a patent for participants in
the standard-setting process. The courts in both of these cases give
some attention to the rules of standard-setting organizations in
establishing this duty. This gives some incentives to these
organizations to develop clear rules requiring disclosure. These rules
would put participants on notice that participation in the standardsetting process has certain liabilities.
One question that remains from these cases is whether mere
knowledge of the proposal of the standard creates a duty to disclose
proprietary rights. There is some suggestion that this might be the
case. In Stambler v. Diebold the court noted: "It was well known...
throughout the industry that [the provisions] were being contemplated
as national and international standards." 69 This indicates that
participation in the standard-setting process might not be required for
the estoppel to apply, mere knowledge of the standard could be
enough. Commentators have also noted that this case could imply that
any party privy to the standardization process may have a duty to
disclose.7 0 This gives some perverse incentives to patent holders. Even
though courts recognize that the standardization process can be
procompetitive, this duty of disclosure provides incentives for
companies to maintain total ignorance of the standard setting process
in order to protect their proprietary rights. The courts need to clarify
this point and should indicate that mere knowledge is not sufficient to
establish the estoppel.
B.

Legal Estoppel (Implied License)

71
In addition to the risk of equitable estoppel, legal estoppe
presents another risk to patent holders. In Wang Laboratories,Inc. v.
Mitsubishi Electronics America, Inc. the court held that to prove the
implied license defense a party must show: (1) that the plaintiff and

67.
68.

Id.
Id. at 1715.

69.

Id.

70.
71.

Epstein, supra note 4.
Legal estoppel is also referred to as "implied license."
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the defendant have an existing relationship; (2) within that
relationship one party transferred to the other a right to use
technology; and (3) the right was transferred for valuable
consideration.72 The court in this case instructed the jury to "consider
the statements and conduct.., from which one could reasonably infer
•...consent

to making, using, or selling products . . . under the

patent. 7 3 This doctrine was applied in a decision that involved
participation by a corporation in setting a standard that would include
its proprietary technology. In this case, Wang Labs owned a patent for
a computer memory module.74 Wang promoted the memory device in
the trade press, and in a meeting with the trade press Wang indicated
that it would not seek patent rights in the device but instead would try
to get others to begin manufacturing the device for Wang to
purchase. 75 In addition, a Wang representative attended several
meetings of the Joint Electronic Device Council ("JEDEC") and
convinced the group to adopt the Wang technology as the industry
standard. 76 After more than two years of lobbying, the module was
adopted by JEDEC as the industry standard and several companies,
77
including the defendant, Mitsubishi, began making the module.
During this time, Mitsubishi had been engaged in ongoing discussion
with Wang about the possible inclusion of the Wang module in
Mitsubishi's product line. 78 Wang encouraged Mitsubishi to begin to
produce the module and agreed to purchase a supply of the product.
However Wang never explicitly disclaimed proprietary holdings.
The Wang court, in reviewing the law, stated that the doctrine of
legal estoppel is narrower than equitable estoppel and requires that a
patentee act to assign the right, receive consideration, and then
attempt to negate the assignment. 79 Legal estoppel depends on an
affirmative transfer of a right, unlike equitable estoppel, which focuses
on misleading conduct.80 In this case, Wang's action before the
standard-setting committee in attempting to have the device
72. Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Electronics Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1576 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1573.
75. Id. at 1575.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1581.
80. Id.
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designated an industry standard was held to reasonably demonstrate
two facts. First, these acts demonstrated Wang received consideration
in the form of wide-spread adoption of the module as the industry
standard with the resulting advantages of a larger number of
producers and lower costs. per unit. 81 Second, these acts indicated that
Wang consented to allow others to make, use, or sell the device.82 The
totality of Wang's acts constituted a transfer of a license to Mitsubishi
to produce the memory module.
The facts in this case are very similar to the facts in the cases
establishing equitable estoppel. Wang's conduct in lobbying for the
adoption of the standard well exceeds what the courts required to
establish equitable estoppel in earlier cases. However, in this case,
only Mitsubishi was granted an implied license, Wang remained free
to enforce the patent against other infringers, even other infringers
that were relying upon the industry standard. This is inconsistent with
the earlier cases.
The courts should be consistent in their approach to disclosure.
Uncertainty will likely result in both unnecessary litigation and
disruption of the standard-setting process, as patent holders try to
decide which approach the court would take. The duty to disclose was
adopted by the standard-setting body to maintain confidence in the
open nature of standards. If these rules do not have some legal force,
there will likely be a chilling effect on the standard-setting process.
Uniform application of the rules will lend some certainty to the
process.
C.

Additional Remedies

In addition to equitable and legal estoppel, there are other
defenses to patent infringement that can be used if the alleged
infringer believes that the patent owner has abused the standardsetting procedure.
1. Misuse

The doctrine of misuse was developed by the courts to ensure
that the patent grant would not be used to secure market power
beyond the scope that Congress granted. 3 Using a patent to unfairly
81.
82.

Id. at 1582.
Id.

83. 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY,
VALIDITY, AND INFRINGEMENT § 19.04 (1996).
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compete constitutes misuse of the patent. 84 The court will then enjoin
the patent holder from enforcing the patent until the misuse has
ended.8 5 This result allows the patent holder to cure the misuse and
thus is a bit less severe than the remedy of equitable estoppel. If
misuse of the patent is found through non-disclosure of the patent to a
standard-setting organization, the misuse could be cured by disclosure
of the patent to the standard-setting body and agreement to license
the proprietary technology to the users of the standard under fair,
non-discriminatory terms.
2.

Inequitable Conduct

Inequitable conduct is a final doctrine that restricts the ability of
a patent owner to enforce a patent under certain conditions.86 This
doctrine focuses on the actions by the patent holder taken in
prosecution of the patent before the PTO. 7 If a patent holder
intentionally misrepresented information to the PTO, the patent will
not be enforceable.88 This can become an issue if in the prosecution of
-a patent, the inventor claims that commercial success is an indication
of the nonobvious and novel nature of the patent.89 The PTO in recent
years has increasingly relied on commercial success as an objective
90
indication of novelty and nonobviousness.
However, the PTO needs to become aware that the standardsetting process presents one way to produce commercial success
without the success being a reflection of the novel nature of the
invention. If a device is adopted as a standard, the widespread use of
the device would indicate a desire within an industry to develop
uniformity by producers. The market success of the product would be
an inaccurate indication of the novelty and utility of the product. This
would be especially true if the prior art is quite similar to the patent.
The market success of the product may solely reflect the fact that the
technology was adopted as an industry standard.
Congress should change the statute to require the PTO to
determine if any industry standards cover the technology contained
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944); In re
Palmer, 451 F.2d 1100, 1102-03 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
90.

CHISUM, supra note 83, at § 19.04.
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within a patent. By making this determination the PTO could more
accurately assess whether commercial success is not, in fact, a
reflection of the novelty and utility of an invention. Standards are now
published on the Internet; searching standards to determine if they
contain a specific technology is increasingly simple.9 By making this
determination, the PTO could prevent a patent from issuing if the
patentee abused the standard setting process.
V
Antitrust Liability
Antitrust liability presents a major concern for participants in
standard-setting organizations. Standardization involves agreements
among horizontal competitors, which draw antitrust scrutiny.92 Unless
there is an agreement on price-or some other per se unlawful
agreement-the courts use the rule of reason to determine if the
93
cooperation among competitors will have anticompetitive effects.
Standard-setting organizations must guard against adopting standards
that unreasonably shut out competitors. Prohibiting any proprietary
technology from inclusion in a standard has been challenged. 94 To
enforce antitrust laws, the FTC has challenged the prohibition of
patented products in standards95 by relying on the rule of reason
analysis to determine if the inclusion would serve procompetitive
ends.

96

Section 5 of the FTC Act provides an antitrust parallel to the
equitable estoppel doctrine. 97 In one consent order, for example, the
FTC had challenged enforcement of patent rights in a product
involved in standard-setting. 98 An industry standard-setting body of
major United States computer manufacturers, the Video Electronics
Standards Association ("VESA"), adopted a design by Dell Computer
for a VL-bus 99 as the industry standard."° Dell representatives who
91. See ANSI Opens Single StandardsPoint, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE NEWS, Mar. 3,
1997, at 3.
92. Epstein, supra note 4, at 881.
93. Id.
94. In re American Soc'y of Sanitary Eng'g, 106 F.T.C. 324 (1995).
95. Id.
96. Nimmer, snpra note 1, at 825-26.
97. 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1996).
98. Dell Computer Corp., 60 Fed. Reg. 57,870 (F.T.C. Nov. 2, 1995) (proposed
consent agreement).
99. The VL-bus is a device that carries information from the central processor of a
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were members of the standard-setting body certified in writing the

belief that their standard did not infringe on any patents owned by
Dell.10 1 After the VL-bus became commercially successful, Dell
sought to enforce its patent. 1°2 The FTC brought an unfair
competition charge stating that competition was restrained by: (1)
hindering the adoption of the standard while the patent matter was
resolved; (2) causing consumers to avoid systems using the VL-bus;
(3) creating added cost to the adoption of the standard; and (4)
chilling the willingness of other manufacturers to participate in the
standard setting process. 3 The FTC argued the equitable estoppel
and inequitable conduct doctrines."° Dell agreed in the consent order
to stop its current attempts to enforce its patent. 05 In announcing the
consent order for public comment, the FTC presented its legal
argument for supporting the complaint:
If a company misrepresents its patent rights to a standard-setting
organization, thereby leading the organization to adopt a particular
standard that may infringe on the company's patent rights, the
company's later efforts to take advantage of market power resulting
from the standard, rather than from some inherent value of the
patent, constitutes a violation of Section 5. Cf. Potter Instrument Co.
v. Storage Technology Corp., 641 F.2d 190 (4th Cir.) (court would

estop enforcement of patent where patent holder participated in a
standard-setting process, intentionally failed to disclose the existence
of its patent, and waited six years 'until the standard was widely
adopted before seeking to enforce the patent), cert. denied 454 U.S.
832 (1981); III P. Areeda, Antitrust Law I 707h at 141-42 (1978)
(negligent misrepresentation to patent office can constitute
exclusionary act for equitable antitrust purposes).' 6
A.

Problems with the Dell Settlement

The Dell consent order harshly applies the protections of
competition. FTC Commissioner Azcuenaga dissented from the
consent order and argued that the complaint established a novel
argument of liability. 0 7 She noted that there was no proof that Dell
computer to peripheral devices, such as disc drives and modems.
100. Dell Computer Corp., 60 Fed. Reg. 57,870.
101. Id. at 57,872

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id.
Id.

107.

Dell Computer Corp., 60 Fed. Reg. at 57,873.

Id.
Id.
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intentionally misled competitors. 08 The commissioner also noted that
the decision placed a duty of care on the standard-setting organization
members to investigate their patent portfolios to determine if any of
their patents contain any technology that would come within a
proposed standard. 0 9
In alleging that Dell's actions constituted unfair competition, the
FTC determined that the actions of Dell would have a chilling effect
on the standard-setting process." 0 However, because technological
standards are adopted quickly, an extensive duty to search may either
decrease the ability to rapidly set standards in dynamic high-tech
industries or chill participation in setting standards. It is unlikely that
corporations will be willing to join in setting standards if participation
jeopardizes patents that required extensive time and capital to secure.
A duty to make exhaustive searches of patent holdings" 1 may
discourage participation in the standard-setting process. The Dell
consent order could slow technological growth.
B.

Duty to Deal

The equities in rendering Dell's patent unenforceable are
uncertain. The use of the duty to deal as a remedy, however, would
mitigate the harshness of the rule. In alleging that Dell had engaged in
unfair competition, the FTC could have used the duty to deal to
formulate the remedy and achieve a more reasonable result.
The courts have imposed a duty to deal with competitors when a
party controls the market power in a resource and uses it to inhibit
competition by denying the resource to competitors. Two cases
illustrate the application of the duty to deal.
In United States v. Terminal RailroadAssn.,112 the Supreme Court
faced the problem of the denial of access to a natural monopoly
controlled by a cartel. Several railroad companies acquired the
Terminal Company, a business that owned the bridge across the
Mississippi River into the terminal at St. Louis." 3 Competing
railroads needed access to the bridge and terminal. 114 The Court held
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See PTO Statistics,53 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 257 (BNA 1997).
224 U.S. 383 (1912).
Id. at 392-93.
Id. at 403.
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that the bridge into St. Louis was a unique resource and due to the
nature of the geography surrounding St. Louis and the locations of the
shipping facilities the resource could not be easily replicated. 1 ' The
Court held that denying competitors access to the bridge constituted
an illegal restraint on interstate commerce and as a remedy the
Terminal Association had to admit to the Association any railroad
that desired entry and provide access to the bridge without
11 6
discrimination and under reasonable terms.
In another opinion, the Court again created a duty to deal. In
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,117 the defendant
denied a competitor access to a needed resource. In this case, the
plaintiff and defendant both operated competing ski areas in Aspen,
Colorado. The defendant operated ski runs on three mountains and
the plaintiff operated ski runs on only one mountain. 118 The two
companies participated in joint marketing, offering a discount ticket to
ski at both companies' facilities for a fixed price. 119 The two
companies divided the revenues by estimating proportional use of the
facilities. 120 However, when the parties could not agree on the
revenues the plaintiff would receive, the defendant discontinued
selling an all-Aspen ticket, and sold tickets for only its own mountains.
The plaintiff filed an action claiming that the refusal constituted
monopolization. 121 The Court held that although there is no general
duty, even for a monopolist, to deal with competitors, if a competitor
acts to make a substantial change in the character of the market and
this change inhibits competition without some legitimate competitive
end, the monopolist can be enjoined from making the market
122
change.
The courts employ several factors used in finding a duty to deal.
First, the courts require that one party control a resource. The party
then must act to leverage the resource so that the resource becomes
crucial to competitors. These acts must serve to restrict competition.
Courts then hold that the duty to deal with competitors without
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 404.
Id. at 410-11.
472 U.S. 585 (1985).
Id. at 585.
Id.
Id. at 590-91.
Id. at 595.
Id. at 600-03.
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discrimination and on reasonable terms will mitigate the
anticompetitive effects. In the case of patent holders participating in
the standard-setting process the patent would constitute the resource.
By acting to have the patent adopted as a standard, the patent holder
acts to leverage the value of the resource in the market. If the patent
holder refuses to license the patent on fair and equal terms,
competition will be restrained. The duty to deal would remedy the
problem.
Both of the cases where the court found a duty to deal were cases
charging monopolization. In contrast, Dell is not charged with
monopolization, only unfair competition. However, the logic of the
Court in Aspen Skiing is applicable. The duty to deal is a flexible
remedy that could be applied in either case. The patent grant will not
necessarily create an economic monopoly; alternatives could still
exist. 123 However, establishing monopoly power is unnecessary and
adds unneeded complexity to the calculation. Under the FTC's theory
of unfair competition, the fact that a company leveraged the value of a
patent would be sufficient to establish misuse of market power and
anticompetitive efforts. "[W]hen a court finds actual anticompetitive
effects, no detailed examination of market power is necessary to judge
the practice unlawful, '' 124 the use of the duty to deal as a remedy
would then be appropriate.
A patent holder who participates in the standard-setting process
is analogous to the defendant in Aspen Skiing. Under ordinary
circumstances there is no duty for a patent holder to deal with
competitors. 125 However, if a patent holder acts to increase the value
of the patent by having the patented technology adopted as an
industry standard, the patent holder's acts warrant the adoption of a
123. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177
(1965). In a tying arrangement, where the tying product is covered by a patent, it had been
generally presumed that sufficient economic power exists to establish that element of an
antitrust violation. See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962); Jefferson
Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984). However, that presumption
has been questioned by four justices of the Supreme Court. Id. at 37 n.7. Many lower courts
have also questioned it. See, e.g., Abbott Lab v. Brennan, 952 P.2d 1346, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
1990); Mozart Co. v. Mercedes Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1346 n.4 (9th Cir.
1987).
124. InternationalAss'n of Conference Interpreters,FTC Dkt. No. 9270 (Feb. 19, 1997)
at 33-34; Toys "R" Us, Initialdecision, FTC Dkt. No. 9278 (Sept. 25, 1997) at 112.
125. Dana W. Hayter, When a License is Worse Than a Refusal: A Comparative
Competitive Effects Standard to Judge Restrictions in Intellectual Property Licenses, 11
BERKELEY TECH L.J. 281, 288 (1996).
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duty to deal. As in Aspen Skiing, the actions that increase the market
necessity of the resource are key to finding of the duty to deal.
In Dell, the Commission advanced four ways that Dell has
inhibited competition by failing to disclose patent ownership while
participating in the standard-setting process. 126 Imposing the duty to
deal provides a superior method of redressing these restraints on
competition. The FTC charged restraint on competition asserting that
Dell's acts delayed the adoption of the standard, caused some parties
to avoid the standard and raised the costs by adding uncertainty to the
adoption of the standard. 127 By insisting on a duty to deal, the FTC
would encourage more rapid resolution of the problem through a
remedy that is effective and less likely to be contested by the accused
company. This would alleviate delay and reduce the cost of adopting
the standard. The FTC also charged that Dell's actions chilled
willingness of corporations to participate in the standard-setting
process. 128 Adopting the duty to deal will be much more likely to
minimize the chilling effect on the standard-setting process than a
remedy that holds patents unenforceable. Corporations have at times
voluntarily agreed to license technology to any interested party on
reasonable terms. 129 Resistance to the duty to deal would be slight.
Patents represent extensive research efforts and are expensive
and time consuming to obtain. 30 It is likely that if companies perceive
that participation in the standard-setting process endangers patent
portfolios there will be a significant reluctance to participate in the
process. The Dell consent order will imperil the ability of standardsetting bodies to rapidly adopt standards. 31 The need to check
extensive patent portfolios for each proposed standard presents an
onerous burden. 3 2 The duty to deal is much less severe than losing all
patent rights. In fact, the duty to deal is what standard-setting bodies
require from participants. 3 3 This indicates the standard-setting
organizations believe that the duty to deal would not be offensive
126. Dell Computer Corp., 60 Fed. Reg. at 57872.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See ADA Announces U.S. Patent Grantfor the Remote Module, BUS. WIRE, Oct.
15, 1996, at 2.
130. Alex Barnum, Proposed Treaty on Patents Under Fire, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 20, 1993,
at B1.
131. Richard H. Stern, Loose Lips Can Sink Standards, OEM MAG., Feb. 1, 1996, at 22.
132. Id.
133. ANSI Procedures, supra note 45.
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either to the participants that hold the patent or the participants that
will be using the standard. In light of these factors, the imposition of a
duty to deal presents a superior method of dealing with unfair
competition claims against patent holders who participate in the
standard setting process without disclosing their patent holdings.
VI
Other Ways of Abating the Problems of Nondisclosure
A.

Increased Awareness of Rules Governing Standardizing Bodies

One solution to the conflict between patents and standards that is
both simple and effective is to have the corporate members of
standard-setting bodies develop greater awareness of the rules
governing disclosure for each standard-setting body in which the
company participates. These rules may differ from one standardsetting body to the next, and some groups make a greater effort to
exclude proprietary information from any standard that is set.
Company representatives to standard-setting groups need to be aware
that any assurances given about their knowledge of patents held by
their organization may later create an estoppel that prevents the
enforcement of patent rights and could also cause antitrust scrutiny.
This could occur even if the representative did not in fact know of the
patent's existence.
B.

Changes to Patent Law

Another way to mitigate the problems caused by patents during
the standard-setting process would be to change the patent
examination procedure. Under the current patent system, applications
remain secret while being examined. The examination procedure can
take several years. During the examination period, the public is
incapable of searching for the patent to discover if technology is in the
public domain. However, the PTO has recognized the disadvantages
of secret prior art and is proposing changing the rules of examination
to require publication of applications after eighteen months. 134 The
early disclosure of applications will allow standard-setting
organizations to search the PTO for any pending patents on
technology that could cover proposed standards.' 35 Some of the
problems of secret patents would be eliminated with this change.
134. Pending Rulemaking, 53 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 14 (BNA 1997).
135. Some small inventors may not want disclosure before the patent issues because
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VII

Conclusion
In the current boom of high technology, industry standards play a
critical role in allowing a wide range of compatible products to
develop, enhancing the value of the resulting products. Companies
voluntarily participate in standard-setting groups and voluntarily
adopt the standards for their product line with the belief that this
and
industry
own
competitiveness
both their
increases
competitiveness. When corporate members participate in the
standard-setting process, the corporation needs to inform their
representatives that regulations may exist that compel the disclosure
of any overlap between the proposed standard and any proprietary
rights held by the corporation. If a representative fails to properly
disclose that the corporation owns a patent that covers the standard,
the courts could find that an estoppel bars the corporation from
enforcing the patent.
Recently, the FTC has acted when a corporation tried to assert
patent rights after participating in a standard-setting organization
while the corporation's proprietary technology was adopted as an
industry standard. 136 The FTC alleged that such practice was a method
of unfair competition that both delays the adoption of the standard
1 37
and chills willingness to participate in the standard-setting process.
The FTC alleged unfair competition without arguing any affirmative
intent to mislead. 38
Finding unenforceable the patent for a product that was a huge
commercial success may create the result the FTC sought to avoid:
discouraging participation in the standard-setting process. A better
solution to the antitrust problems created by patent owners
participating in the standard-setting procedure would be to impose a
duty to deal. Where a corporation leveraged the usefulness of a patent
by lobbying for the patented technology to be standardized, the courts
may impose a duty to make the technology available to competitors
without discrimination under preset terms.1 39 The doctrine would
require that the licenses be provided in a non-discriminatory manner
others who see it may be able to invent around the patent before it issues.
136. Dell Computer Corp., 60 Fed. Reg. at 57,870.
137.
138.

Id.
Id.

139. MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th
Cir. 1983).
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and at a reasonable rate.140 It mandates the voluntary procedure of
standard-setting bodies that require the owner of a patent who
participates in the standard-setting process to provide licenses for
141
standard users under these same terms.
Changes in patent law should have some effect on the problem of
hidden patents during the standard-setting process. The PTO has
proposed changing its procedure and publishing applications eighteen
months after the application is filed. 142 This change will allow a
standard-setting body to be able to search the literature for patents
that might cover the standard. This changes the equities of failure to
disclose if the failure to disclose was inadvertent.
With proper attention by the member corporations and the
courts, the integrity of the standard-setting process can be maintained
and standards will continue to benefit high technology industries.
Standards hold great benefit for the economy. Proper stewardship by
the courts and regulatory agencies can ensure the integrity of standard
setting for years to come.

140. Id.
141. ANSI Procedures, supra note 45.
142. Pending Rulemaking, supra note 134, at 14.

